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Much has been written  in recent decades by economists about the
inefficiencies,  injustices  and  environmentally  degrading  conse-
quences  of traditional  U.S.  agricultural  policies,  especially  com-
modity  price and income  support policies.  Yet farmers  and many of
their supporters  continue  to  press  for these  traditional  policies  and
Congress  continues  to produce  them. And the general  public  seems
relatively  disinterested.
All  of this is  highly frustrating  to agricultural  economists  and
others  who  feel  strongly  that agricultural  policy needs  reform.  One
result has been  a spate of new theories and explanations  about why
agricultural policy is "un-reformable."
Is  it  foolish  to waste  any more  resources  debating  and  analyzing
agricultural policy?  I do not think so.  We should remember  that the
policies of the  New  Deal,  which  we  still  have in  modified form,  did
not get put in place overnight.  They  were the products  of at least
two-perhaps  four-decades  of intensive  debate,  false  starts and
many frustrated initiatives.  Even then, those  policies might not have
been adopted had it not been for a national economic  crisis of histor-
ic  proportions.  So  maybe  it  is not unreasonable  that major  new  di-
rections  in agricultural policy  may take  a few decades  of debate.
And wouldn't it be ironic if a modern-day financial crisis-the na-
tional budget  deficit-became  the  catalyst  for  sharply curtailing  the
policies that descended  from the New Deal and thereby set the stage
for a new era of rural policy?
Moreover,  it is really not hard to explain why we got the New Deal
policies,  why they are hard to reform and  what it will take to ulti-
mately bring about reform.
Basically I treat four themes in this presentation: the past and pre-
sent of agricultural policy are explainable;  present policies  do not
serve  the public  interest very  well; these  policies can and will  be
gradually reformed;  and extension  public  policy educators  should be
held accountable  for their contributions to the process  and  outcome
of that reform.
33Why Government Got More Involved
The roots of modern agricultural policies come  from the turbulent
period between World War  I and World War II. In retrospect,  the
policy developments  of that period  are explainable.  Let me give  you
my view  of four factors  explaining  public intervention-government
involvement  in agriculture  in a major way-in the first half of the
1900s.
Economic and Physical Characteristics of Agriculture
First  of all  there  are  some  basic  characteristics  of  agriculture,
some  unique  to the United  States,  that help explain the temptations
and pressures for government  to become  involved  in agricultural
markets.
Farming is a biological process. This means production is inher-
ently  unpredictable  and  highly  variable.  Weather  variations  cause
production  variations.  These,  in turn,  cause  price variations.  Farm-
ers react to price variations and sometimes that makes the variability
worse.  Thus,  farming  is not like  manufacturing  cars  or television
sets.
The cobweb  effect of disruptions in supply is important because  it
could  mean  wasted  resources  in production,  unstable  food supplies
(including  export  disruptions)  and  undependable  incomes  to  farm-
ers.  Thus,  at various  times,  both producers  and  consumers  have
sought  government  involvement  in  agriculture  to  reduce  instability
of supplies  and prices.
Resources in  agriculture are relatively immobile. Land  often has
few alternative  uses. It is kept in production as long as it can pro-
duce something  that returns  at  least  the  out-of-pocket  costs  of pro-
duction.  Of course,  land can  be used for houses, shopping  centers
and recreation  purposes,  but only a small part of the land can be
used this way.  That was  especially true in the  1930s and earlier. La-
bor was a bit more mobile  in U.S. agriculture than was land,  but not
much more.  Many farmers  felt they were not qualified  to do any-
thing other than farm.  Prior to WW  II, there were few  off-farm jobs
readily  available  to  farmers  and  farm workers.  Thus,  the  labor re-
source was said to be "trapped" in farming.
Capital goods  (barns, machinery,  specialized  facilities,  etc.)  in ag-
riculture often have few alternative uses.  Liquid capital,  of course,  is
highly mobile and can quickly be moved to other parts of the econo-
my.  The  importance  of immobile  resources  to farm  policy  is that
even though returns to land,  labor and capital goods  may be very
low,  these resources  continue  to be  used to  produce  longer than
would be  the case  in some  other  industries.  Capital  stock  continues
to be  used to produce  until it wears  out,  and labor stays in  farming
until the  next generation  comes  along.  As  for land,  the  cropland
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As  a result of all this resource  immobility,  there  is a chronic  tenden-
cy toward  over-production  and depressed  prices and incomes.
In recent decades,  the mobility of some agricultural resources,  es-
pecially labor, has increased.  Nevertheless,  over most of the last six-
ty years,  resource productivity has grown  faster than demand for
food.  The  level of resources  needed in  agriculture has declined  fast-
er than resources  have been withdrawn  from the  sector. The  result
has been depressed prices and below-average returns on investment
in farming.  The importance  of this characteristic  of the  farming  sec-
tor will become apparent  shortly.
Farmers are price-takers, not price-makers. In the  United  States,
the farming  sector has  come closer  to being a purely competitive
market than most other  sectors  of the  economy.  Unlike  automobile
makers  and other businesses in which a few large firms dominate
the  market,  there  are  too many  farms  for  any  one  of them to  be
large  enough  to  set their  own prices.  Prices are determined  by the
aggregate  forces  of supply and demand  (in the absence  of govern-
ment programs).  Thus, individual farmers  are  not constrained  by
concerns  about  how more  or less  production  on their farms  will  af-
fect prices. But, what farmers do in total does determine prices.
Agriculture has had rapid technological change and productivity
growth. This is  not so much a generic characteristic  of agriculture  as
a basic fact of U.S.  agriculture  since the  1930s.  During most of the
twentieth century,  and especially  since the  1930s,  there has been
strong growth  in the productivity of resources used in farming,  often
faster than total demand has grown.
This means  the supply  curve  has  been  shifting  to  the  right faster
than demand has been shifting.  In other words, the amount  farmers
are  willing to supply at any given price has been increasing faster
than the amount people  are willing to buy at that price.  The net re-
sult  has been  downward  pressure  on  prices  (real prices  of basic
commodities have trended down over time).
Food demand has grown slowly.  The United States,  like  most mod-
ern industrial  nations,  is a "food  mature"  economy.  This means that
most of the population  is relatively  well-fed  and well-clothed.  As  in-
comes rise,  not much of the additional  income is spent on food.  In
economists'  terms,  the  income  elasticity  of demand  for  food  is  low.
Furthermore, most  of the additional  expenditure  on food  is for serv-
ices and value-added to food rather than to increased volume of food
consumed.  Population has  also been growing  slowly.  The net result
has  been  slow overall  growth  in demand  for basic food  at the  farm
level.
Demand for food has been price inelastic. Since the  1930s,  and es-
pecially  since  the  1950s  the amount  of food consumed  by people  in
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if the price of food goes down,  consumers  do not eat much more,
and  if the price  of food  goes  up,  consumers  tend  to  sacrifice  some-
thing  else  before  they  quit eating.  The degree  of responsiveness  to
price  changes  varies  by type  of food  or  commodity.  Demand  for
foods perceived  as more  basic responds  less,  and demand for foods
thought of as luxuries  or less essential  is more responsive to price
changes.
The observation  that the demand for food is price inelastic,  or rel-
atively  unresponsive  to price changes,  has an important  implication
for  farm policy.  A  reduction  in supply  leads  to  a proportionately
greater  rise  in  price.  This  raises the value  of total  revenue.  The
temptation to raise farm revenues by artificially reducing  supplies on
the market  has bedeviled  agriculture  and policymakers  since  the
beginning of modern agricultural policy  in the  1930s,  and some kind
of supply control has been a consistent feature  of farm policies for
most of the last sixty years.
Combined effects  of basic characteristics  of agriculture.  When the
characteristics  listed above  are put together,  it is  easier to under-
stand why agriculture  has been viewed as unstable,  risky and un-
profitable.  The pressures that lead to over-production,  depressed
prices and incomes,  and instability-and the inelastic  demand for
food-help explain  why the solution has always seemed to be to con-
trol supply,  create artificial  shortages and raise prices. Since no one
farmer  acting  alone could  raise prices  by cutting his/her production,
it seemed logical to have government  be the agent to control produc-
tion in order to get higher prices.
Incidentally,  rarely  have farmers  relied  solely on  supply manage-
ment  programs  to raise  prices.  Through  the  political  process,  they
got the higher prices  guaranteed  first.  Once  higher  prices were  set
(through loan rates and other price support tools),  farmers and their
organizations  could  then lobby  for liberal  treatment  and  loopholes
on supply controls. Their  efforts often succeeded,  and that meant
over-production,  or production  beyond what could be  sold at the
higher prices.  But that was the government's  problem!
Many of these basic characteristics  of U.S. agriculture  are com-
mon to  agriculture  worldwide,  and most,  if  not  all,  apply to  the  in-
dustrial and food-surplus nations.
Societal  Values  and Beliefs
The  second major  factor  explaining  public  intervention  has  to  do
with societal values  and  beliefs.  An  "agrarian  fundamentalism"  has
been  a  dominant  feature  of the  American  culture  from  the  early
days of nationhood.  This agrarian philosophy is a notion that farming
is a  morally  superior  occupation-work  that is  closer to  God and
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from  a mixture  of ideas  and roots  from many  sources.  Thomas
Jefferson espoused  it.  He  argued  that a nation of small freeholders
was the best way  to protect  a democratic  society.  Small  "family"
farmers  were seen to  be honest hard  workers who had  a vested  in-
terest in the common  good, because  as freeholders  they owned  a
piece of the nation.
This societal value  was  still powerful  in the  1930s  when a majority
of people  still  lived in rural areas  and had some direct  or indirect
connection  to farming.  Even today,  many Americans  are still only
one  or two  generations  removed  from rural or farm  life  and  can
identify  with the problems  and benefits  of farm  living.  The  "family
farm"  still  enjoys  strong emotional  and political  support from the
American people.
Economic  Feasibility of Providing Assistance  to Farmers
Third,  by the  1930s,  farmers  were a small enough part of the total
economy that it was economically and politically  feasible to make
transfer payments  to them.  When most Americans  were farmers,
farming was most of the economy.  When farmers were doing poorly,
the economy and public revenues did poorly. It was simply not feasi-
ble for a minority of the population to make transfer payments to the
majority population.
As farmers  became  a smaller part of the total economy,  providing
some assistance  to them was not only viewed sympathetically  by the
urban  and  non-farm  population  (many with recent  farm roots),  but
was  also  increasingly  financially  feasible  and less  burdensome  to
non-farm  taxpayers.
An observation:  In general,  poorer nations of the world,  whose
farmers  make up a  large part of the population  and whose  farmers
tend  to be  even poorer  than the  rest of the  population,  tax agri-
culture.  Wealthier  industrialized  nations,  whose farmers  make up  a
small  part  of their  population  and  whose  farmers  tend to  be
wealthier than the rest of the population,  subsidize farmers.
In both  cases,  national  wealth  is regressively  redistributed.  This
seemingly  perverse  situation  is merely  a matter  of practical  expedi-
ency.  In many  poor  nations,  taxing  agriculture  is  one of the  few
ways  to  get public revenue  to invest in the rest of the  economy.  In
rich nations, the rest of the population can afford,  often at very small
per capita costs, to support agriculture,  and the political sympathy is
there to make it happen.
1930s  Economic  and Social Conditions
The  fourth factor  that  served  as  a  catalyst for major  government
intervention in agriculture  was  the economic  and social  crisis of the
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War  I,  economic  conditions  in rural America  were  severely de-
pressed  for more than two  decades.  The Great Depression  of the
1930s merely  exacerbated  the poor  conditions  that had prevailed  in
agriculture  during the 1920s.  During this period, most farms were
small and their owners  poor.  Yet farming  was  still the  predominant
activity  in most rural parts of the country and,  in the  1920s,  rural
people were still nearly half the total population.
Thus,  the large number  of economically  depressed  people-a big
part of the total population-constituted  a major social problem as
well  as an economic  problem for the nation.  Addressing the prob-
lems of the rural population  was a high priority during the 1930s,  and
providing  financial assistance  to farmers  was one way  policymakers
thought they could help.
So,  there  you have my explanation  for why  the  U.S.  government
got  involved  in modern  farm  policies.  The  basic  conditions  of  agri-
culture  led farmers  to  seek intervention  on their behalf;  strong
agrarian  values  and  beliefs  gave  the  nation's  people  and  pol-
icymakers  warm fuzzies about helping "family  farmers";  the growth
in industrial wealth and the decline in numbers  of farmers relative to
the non-farm population made it possible  to redistribute  wealth from
non-farm to farm;  and a national economic  and social crisis  lit the
match!
Characteristics of Policy  Responses
Agricultural  policies  since the  1920s and  1930s have  focused heav-
ily  on  improving financial  conditions  for producers  of selected  com-
modities  (an inherent  unfairness),  especially  feed  grains,  food
grains,  cotton,  oilseed and dairy products.  Those policies have been
varied  and  complex,  but  there  have been some  common  charac-
teristics.
Supply  Management
Almost  continuously  since  the  1930s,  U.S.  agricultural  policy  has
contained some element of supply control.
Since  farmers  were  too numerous  to act  in concert  to manage
supply (some farmer organizations tried and failed),  the federal gov-
ernment has acted as their monopoly agent or manager.  But, gov-
ernment has not always managed well.
Supply  controls  have  sometimes  been mandatory  and sometimes
voluntary (with incentives offered to get cooperation).
The objectives  of supply management have been several:
*  Increase  commodity  prices  by  "shorting"  the market  (with  inel-
astic demand,  this also increased revenues to farmers).
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* Assure  a more stable  supply  of commodities  to meet  domestic
and export needs.
Supply controls  used in U.S.  farm programs have tended to  be in-
direct  controls.  Most often,  for broad-acre  crops,  the attempts  have
been  to control  supply by  controlling  one  major  input,  land.  Mean-
while,  no  limits  were  put  on  other  inputs  such  as  fertilizer,
pesticides, water and new technology.  In fact, these other inputs, in-
cluding the credit to buy them,  were often subsidized.  Farmers also
generally took their least productive acres out of production. The re-
sults have been slippage  in land control and ineffective  control  of
supply.
For most commodities,  supply control has meant control of U.S.
production.  There  are  exceptions,  such  as  sugar,  whereby  high
prices are maintained  by limiting imports.
Price and Income  Supports
Since the late 1930s,  supply control programs  have been accom-
panied by price  and income support programs.  Although the  earlier
rationale  for production controls  was to reduce supply and strength-
en prices,  production  controls in recent  decades  have come  to be
seen by farmers  as the political  price that must be paid to get access
to price supports.
Prices have  been supported  in several  familiar  ways including
non-recourse  loans,  target prices  with  deficiency  payments  and
other price support mechanisms.
Price  Stabilization
Several  government-sponsored  storage  programs  have  been  de-
signed to stabilize  prices by taking supplies off the market  during
times of surplus and putting them back on the market when there
are shortages.  These  storage programs  have been  less than  fully
successful because  of the political temptation to use them to raise
prices  and  incomes,  rather than to  smooth  out supplies  and prices.
Import quotas and  barriers and marketing  orders are other tools  of
price stabilization.
Risk Reduction
While  the  aforementioned  characteristics  of modern  U.S.  agri-
cultural policy have transferred some farmer risks to the rest of soci-
ety,  there have also been specific  risk reduction  programs,  such as
federal crop insurance and loan guarantees.
39Demand Expansion
Another recurring theme in U.S. farm  policy has been the interest
in strengthening  commodity prices and producers'  incomes by ex-
panding demand for farm-produced  products. Examples of such pro-
grams include:  food stamps  for the poor to expand domestic  food
consumption;  disposal  of surplus  commodities  to  needy  groups  and
charities;  food aid for other countries; research on development  and
marketing of new products ranging from foods to bio-fuels;  autho-
rization  of commodity  "check off" collections  for market-expanding
research  and promotion programs;  support for private  industry
groups to set up  overseas  programs  to promote  use of U.S.  farm
products; export credits  and credit guarantees;  direct export sub-
sidies; and public investment  in research and technology  to help the
United States be a low cost competitor in world markets.
Consequences  of U.S.  Agricultural Policies
U.S.  agricultural policies  and programs  have been put in place  to
achieve  several stated  and implied objectives.  Among these  are  sta-
bilization  of farm commodity  supplies and prices, enhancement  of
producer incomes,  assurances  of adequate  supplies of affordable
food  and preservation  of the  "family  farm"  structure  of the  farming
sector. Most serious  analyses suggest that some of the intended ben-
efits have been achieved,  accompanied by many unintended  side ef-
fects and longer-term consequences.
*  Programs reduced risk and supported a technological revolution in
U.S.  agriculture.  Price support provisions  of farm  programs  did
reduce  risks  in farming by  stabilizing  prices and increasing  short-
term profitability.  With  reduced risk, farmers were more willing to
borrow money to invest in technological improvements  and lenders
were more  willing to  lend. This tendency  was abetted by the estab-
lishment of new  credit institutions just to serve agriculture  and  by
credit subsidies.  These new developments  coincided  with the avail-
ability of a stream of new technologies  in the  1930s,  40s,  and 50s.
This technological  revolution greatly increased  the productivity,
production capacity and global competitiveness  of U.S.  agriculture.
* Agricultural policies improved farmers' incomes but gains were dif-
ficult to maintain. Clearly,  producers  of some  agricultural  com-
modities  had  higher incomes in  some  years because of the  various
price  support  and  subsidy  programs.  But the higher incomes  con-
tributed to forces  that undermined  the longer-term  value of this in-
come.  Studies have  shown that much  of the  higher income  was
capitalized  into  higher asset values,  especially  land values.  Farm-
ers received the benefit of these higher values of assets only if they
owned the assets. The higher asset values also became higher long-
er-term fixed  costs of production,  and  ultimately  led to pressure
from farmers to increase  subsidies  to offset the higher  costs.  Thus,
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values,  especially land,  and contributed  to an upward cost-price
spiral.
* Support policies led to over-investment in  agriculture.  Higher  in-
comes  and  subsidized  credit  led to  over-investment  in  machinery
and  equipment,  capital facilities  and  various new technologies.  As
a result, the  tendency to overproduce  farm  commodities  was  com-
pounded  and greater reliance  had to be put on supply control  pro-
grams.  Because domestic  demand  for farm  products  did  not keep
pace with growth in capacity  to  produce,  exports  also became  a
critical  outlet for excess  production.  When exports  did  not expand
as rapidly in the 1980s  as in the 1970s,  the over-investment in the
U.S.  agricultural  production  capacity  became  unsustainable,  and
for  the first time since  the  1920s and  1930s,  there  was a  massive
withdrawal of capital from the farming  sector and a major deflation
in  asset values  (Lee).  This was  a very wasteful  and painful  adjust-
ment, but one that could be attributed in part to the policies that
led to over-investment.
* Agricultural policies fostered major structural  change in  the farm-
ing sector. The combination  of increased stability,  productivity  and
technological  change  led  directly to fewer  and larger  farms.  This is
because  individual  farmers  or  workers could directly  manage
larger  and  larger  operations  as technology  was  substituted  for la-
bor.  Larger  and more  efficient  tractors  and equipment  meant  one
farmer could farm much larger tracts of land on a timely basis. The
technology  revolution  also  meant farmers became  less  self-suffi-
cient;  that is,  they became  more  dependent  on non-farm suppliers
of fuel,  chemicals,  seeds  and  other supplies  and the  credit  to  buy
them.  This also  meant more of each  dollar of income  from com-
modity sales went to pay outside  suppliers rather than being re-
tained by the farmer who previously had produced most of the nec-
essary inputs on the  farm.  The smaller net  margin per dollar  of
income meant farmers had to increase  sales volumes  to maintain
acceptable net  incomes. Smaller  farmers had to  choose whether to
increase  the  size  of their  operations  to  maintain  competitive  farm
incomes,  to get out of farming altogether,  or to supplement their
farm  incomes  with  off-farm  income.  As  a result  of these  forces,
which are partly  due to the agricultural support policies  in place
since the  1930s,  agriculture  has been transformed from  a low-tech-
nology,  labor-intensive  industry to  a high-technology,  capital-inten-
sive  industry  with  much  greater  concentration  of production  in
fewer,  larger  farming operations  (a good summary  is  found  in
Tweeten).  In the 1930s there were more than six million farms in
the United  States.  Today there  are about two million farms.  farm-
ing about the same total acreage,  producing  a several-fold increase
in total output,  with one-half of the value  of all production  coming
from about 75,000 large farms (Peterson and Brooks).
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result  of incentives  to  over-invest  and to  use  alternative  inputs  to
offset  limits on the amount of land that could be planted to a specif-
ic crop,  the mix of land, labor and purchased inputs used to pro-
duce some  crops is different from the most efficient mix that would
be  used  if there  were no  distortions caused  by  agricultural pro-
grams.  More chemical  fertilizers  and  pesticides  are used  to  get
more production because land use has been limited by supply con-
trol programs.  Supply controls that limit only land use have encour-
aged  investment  in irrigation  systems.  The inefficiencies  in  use  of
national  resources,  especially  capital,  resulting  from distortions
caused  by farm  policies,  cost the  overall  economy  thousands  of
jobs.
* Consumer effects of agricultural  policies are mixed.  The effects  of
current  U.S.  agricultural  policies  on  the  cost of  food  are  small.
Products  made from basic commodities such as grain probably cost
less than they might  cost otherwise  because  programs  for these
commodities  tend  to stimulate  over-production  and lower prices
and, currently,  purchasers  buy the  commodities  at market  prices,
not  target prices.  Also,  the existence of support programs for more
than five decades probably means the United States has larger pro-
duction capacity,  larger  supplies and lower market  price than
would  otherwise  have been the  case.  Also,  the abundant supplies
and low  prices  of grains mean  more  plentiful  supplies  of livestock
products.  For some  specialty  commodities,  such as  sugar,  peanuts
and milk, consumers  pay more because  of the  way support is pro-
vided to  producers  of those commodities.  Take peanuts,  for exam-
ple.  The policies set a very  high guaranteed  minimum price, re-
strict production  to drive market prices up to the guaranteed price,
and provide import barriers to cheaper foreign peanuts. The result
is fewer peanuts at higher costs to consumers.
Overall,  U.S.  consumers  have  access to  abundant  food at low
costs,  allowing  them  to spend  more  than  85  percent  of their in-
comes  for other needs and desires.  However,  the distortions  in re-
source use because  of agricultural  policies  have caused some  other
concerns for consumers.  These  concerns are food safety and  envi-
ronmental degradation.  The food safety concerns came from heavy
use of chemical pesticides and fertilizers that may leave unsafe res-
idues on food or contaminate drinking water.  Some of the environ-
mental concerns also stem from the heavy use  of chemicals  and the
more  intense  use  of land  and water  because  of the  supply control
and support programs.
* Benefits and cost of U.S. agricultural  policies have been distributed
unevenly. While modern  farm policies and programs were  original-
ly put  in place to  assist  a farm  sector that was economically  de-
pressed  and disadvantaged,  the programs  continue even though
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production  value  of $100,000  and more)  have incomes greater than
those  for  average  non-farmers,  and wealth  many times greater.
The  result is  a regressive  redistribution  of income  from  taxpayers
generally  to  operators  of commercial  farms.  Further, studies  show
that even  among farmers,  80  to  90 percent  of farm  program  direct
benefits  go to  10  to  15  percent  of all farmers  (Whittaker).  Many
farmers  get no benefits  at all if they  do not produce the com-
modities covered  by the farm support programs.
For producers  of some  specialty commodities,  such as  sugar,  pea-
nuts and milk,  the benefits  of the  support  programs  are captured
by a small number of producers,  while the costs are borne  by tax-
payers and consumers.
To the extent  that higher incomes resulting from support programs
get capitalized  into higher  land values,  the beneficiaries  are land-
owners.  If these  are non-farm  landlords,  they get the benefit while
farmers who rent the land have to pay higher rents.
U.S.  agricultural  support  programs  have  provided  assistance  pri-
marily to farm operators and asset owners,  not to farm workers.
Thus, the costs of some major technological  improvements,  such as
mechanical  cotton harvesters,  have  been borne almost entirely  by
the displaced workers and their families.
The  distributions  of benefits  and costs  of various  agriculture  sup-
port  programs  are  neither  well-documented  nor  well-understood,
but they are clearly uneven.
*Treasury costs of U.S. agricultural  policies have been high. In re-
cent  decades,  most  of the direct costs of farm  support programs
have  been borne  by  taxpayers  rather than consumers.  This  is  be-
cause producers of grains,  cotton and oilseeds receive  most of their
benefits  as  direct  "deficiency"  payments,  rather  than through  ar-
tificially  high market prices.  For  milk, both consumers  and  tax-
payers have  to  pay because  treasury costs  are incurred to buy ex-
cess  supplies,  creating  an  artificial  shortage  and  resulting  in  con-
sumers paying higher milk prices.
Most  of the treasury  costs  of modern  U.S.  farm programs  have
been  incurred  since  1980  (Rapp).  The  1985  farm  bill lowered  loan
rates  (support  prices)  to let market  prices prevail  and  provided
support through direct income  (deficiency) payments.  The resulting
programs were more market-oriented but also more expensive.
* Some U.S. agricultural  policies have fostered protectionist  border
policies. As is the case  in most industrial countries,  protectionist
border  policies  have to  be established  to protect  domestic  support
programs.  High support prices require  import controls to keep buy-
ers  from  substituting  cheaper  foreign  commodities  for  domestic
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for sugar, peanuts and dairy products.
What Have  We  Learned?
First, I believe  it is fair to say the United States has not had a com-
prehensive  food  and agriculture  policy.  What  we have had is an in-
come enhancement  policy for producers  of selected  commodities.
The policies have  been  essentially  of,  by and  for  commercial and
larger producers  of those  commodities.  For the  most part,  our  pol-
icies have  ignored or  put low priority  on farm  workers,  consumers,
environmental  interests,  food safety  and rural problems.  Obviously,
this is  somewhat  of an  over-statement.  Recent  comprehensive  farm
bills have included titles  on many  of the  aforementioned  topics.  But,
it is  still true that commodity  price supports  and income transfers  to
commodity producers  have  been the  consuming interest  of the  agri-
cultural  establishment.
I  believe this is gradually changing,  partly because there are now
broader  interests  represented  around  the  policy  negotiating  table.
Environmental  programs  such as  water  quality,  wetlands,  the Con-
servation  Reserve  Program (CRP),  etc.  and food  safety programs
are  certainly becoming  more  prominent features  of agricultural  leg-
islation.  But hired farm workers and migrant  laborers  are not  likely
to see much regarding their interests in traditional farm bills.  Efforts
to  ensure  worker  safety  and  health  have  mostly  originated  outside
the  agricultural  establishment  and have often been opposed  by
farmers  and their representatives.
A second and more  positive  general observation  is  that there have
been some  successes.
* The  establishment  of new,  agriculturally-oriented  credit  institu-
tions  and  stabilization/support  of  commodity  prices  in  the  1930s
and  1940s,  combined  with the  new technologies  resulting from
major public investments  in research, made possible the  surge in
productivity  that modernized  American  agriculture,  lowered the
real cost of food and made it possible to devote the vast majority
of the nations  non-land  resources  to improving  other  aspects  of
the  quality  of life.  This  is  a huge contribution  and  should never
be unappreciated.  But it is not necessarily  a rationale for con-
tinuing current programs into the future.
* Recent  reforms  have reduced  distortions  in  prices  and resource
allocations.  Replacing  loan  rates  (support  prices)  with  target
prices  and deficiency payments  was a major step  in the  direction
of a more market-oriented  production sector. Also a combination
of fixed program  yields and  "flex"  acres  (a reduction  in the crop
eligible  for subsidies) means that, at the margin, as much as one-
fourth or more  of the production  of affected commodities  is being
produced  for market prices.  These recent developments  have
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petitiveness in world markets.
* There have been improvements  on the environmental  front.  Soil
erosion is far less  a problem today than fifty  years ago.  No-till
and reduced  tillage are common in some areas.  Our pesticides
are safer and used more judiciously  (a far cry from  the days
when  we sprayed  DDT  on everything and threw the empty con-
tainers  in the creek).  Compared to the  1950s,  60s and 70s,  we are
more likely today  to preserve  wetlands  than drain them,  and,  in
general,  we are  far more conscious  of water  quality and long-
term sustainability than were previous generations.
* Food  is  safer  to eat  and less  likely  to be  as  fatty  and salty as  in
the past.  We are also  more conscious  of food safety and healthful
eating habits.
A third observation  is that often the programs put in place  do not
achieve the intended objectives,  and often there are unexpected  and
unintended  side effects,  especially in the longer run.  Examples
abound  and this  audience is familiar with them.  These outcomes re-
sult in part from lack of clarity and consensus about objectives  of
policy,  failure to conduct adequate prior analyses of probable  effects
of policies,  slippage between  policy and implementation,  and gener-
al unawareness  on the part of policymakers and their constituents of
the consequences  of specific policies.
My fourth observation is that the  legislative  successes  of the  com-
modity  organizations  and  the  single issue interest  groups have
caused the general farm organizations to re-examine  their strategies
and  to focus  their  energies  more  narrowly  on commodity/producer
support  policies in recent  years,  in contrast  to their representing
rural interests more broadly earlier in the century (see Browne for a
more in-depth treatment  of this point). This probably also caused the
U.S.  Department  of Agriculture  (USDA)  to  become  more narrowly
focused  on traditional  commodity  support  and  trade  policies  in  the
1970s  and 1980s,  at a time when many in society  were expressing  in-
terest in agricultural  matters from  a broader perspective.  This tend-
ency on the part of USDA  was likely reinforced  by the restructuring
of the agriculture committees,  especially in the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives.
A fifth observation  is that our policies have often been very ineffi-
cient in achieving objectives such as income transfers.
Sixth, policies  established long enough to build up a benefitting
clientele, are hard to reform, even though the situation originally ad-
dressed by the policies may no longer exist. More on this shortly.
Finally, and to the point of this conference,  the public's under-
standing of the  agricultural economy  and  of agricultural  policy  is
abysmal.  This  is  true  even among  farm  and rural people,  to say
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cultural  policy.  But what  does  it say for the  effectiveness  of decades
of public policy education?  This lack of public  understanding  makes
it possible  for special interests to develop  policies that serve them
well,  but which  may  not be  in the  long-run interests  of society  at
large or even of the agricultural industry.
At this point  it serves the  purpose  of my thesis  to  briefly  summa-
rize my view  of the status of agriculture,  especially the farm produc-
tion sector,  and the policies for that sector.
Summary Status of U.S.  Agriculture and Policy
What is the status  of the American farm sector?  That question  can
be  answered  in terms  of financial  conditions,  organization  of the
farm sector,  financial structure  of the sector  and in many other
ways. For the sake  of dialogue,  let me throw  out a perspective  on
the status of U.S. agriculture,  especially the farm production  sector.
The  farm  sector  represents  less than  2  percent  of the  nation's
gross national product (GNP) and labor force  (the proportion con-
tinues  to  decline)  and less  than  10 percent  of the  rural economy.  In
part that is a tribute to the success of investments  in science and ed-
ucation,  which  allow providing  a growing value of output with a de-
clining  drain on the nation's resources.  This has permitted  an abun-
dance  of food and fiber while freeing  up resources to invest in other
improvements  in the  material  well-being  of the population.  That  is
the ultimate mark of a sector's success!
As an  aside,  most of rural America  was populated  to develop the
natural  resource  based industries:  agriculture,  forestry  and  mining.
All these  industries  have  seen rapid  technological  advances,  mean-
ing that fewer and fewer  people are  required for more  and  more
output.  Thus,  the  amount  of cropland  and forest  land  has stayed
about the  same,  but relatively  few  people  are required to  do the
work.  This has led to a natural depopulation  of the countryside;  a
phenomenon  having nothing  to  do with  low  commodity  prices  or
hard times in farming-nor  with evil plots in corporate headquarters
or government offices.
So,  we have  a vigorous  agricultural  sector that  is highly  com-
petitive,  producing  an abundance  of food  for our  tables,  but requir-
ing very  few people.  How  few?  The more than  6  million farms  of
1940  are now  down to around  2  million.  Of these,  75,000  farms pro-
duce one half of all the value of production.  About 550,000 to 600,000
farms produce  90 to 95 percent of all agricultural production or virtu-
ally all commercial  agricultural  output. The rest of the producers,  on
average,  are not poor,  do not farm for a living and often do not even
identify themselves as farmers.  Within that set,  of course,  there is
great diversity, from wealthy weekend hobby farmers to Black oper-
ators of small North Carolina tobacco farms living in poverty.
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commercial  farming sector  are competitive  and doing as well or bet-
ter financially than clothing  stores, restaurants and other small busi-
ness sectors  of the  economy.  In a given year,  some farms make a
profit and some lose,  but that is not greatly different from  other sec-
tors of the economy.  It is not unusual for other small business sectors
to  experience  10  percent  and higher annual  failure  rates  (based on
data in Miller).  In  all of the  1980s,  the toughest  decade  since the
1930s,  the United  States never had  a farm  business failure  rate that
exceeded  3  percent  per year.  In fact,  in the  1980s the proportion  of
farmers going out of business for all reasons  was not out of line with
the long-term  trend.  The  drop in farm numbers, the smallest  of any
decade since the 1930s,  occurred primarily because of fewer new en-
trants than normal (Stam).
The 550,000  to  600,000  largest farms not only produce  most of the
nation's agricultural products,  but the average income  of their oper-
ators is  above the national average  for all households, their net
worths typically  far exceed those  of non-farm households  or com-
parable  small businesses,  and they receive most of the benefits  of
federal subsidy  programs.  In  fact,  since  virtually  all the deficiency
payments  and  other  direct  subsidies  go to  producers  of three  com-
modity  groups  (feed  grains,  food grains  and  cotton),  approximately
90 percent of total direct deficiency  payments go to about 200,000
(about 10 percent) of all producers.
Thus,  while the price  and income support programs do transfer
several  billion dollars  each  year  from taxpayers  that on  average
have less income and wealth than the farmers receiving it (called re-
gressive  redistribution  of income),  there  is  little evidence  to support
claims  that we  would  suffer a  shortage  of food and fiber without
those payments.  Moreover,  because  of the way  we  go about sub-
sidizing  agriculture,  it  costs about  $1.40  to transfer  $1 to farmers
(Roningen and Dixit). Were  it not for farmers' distaste of transparent
welfare,  it  would  be  cheaper just  to forget  the programs and  write
checks directly  to farmers each year.
Meanwhile,  the  "small  family  farmers,"  those  other 1.5  million  or
so farmers whose names are invoked in support of farm welfare,  get
virtually no benefit from farm programs.  In fact, we could greatly  in-
crease  farm  prices  and  do relatively  little  to  affect the general  well-
being of small farmers  (and in the process wipe out our foreign mar-
kets and have to shrink our agricultural plant dramatically).
This farm  sector that provides an abundance  of output with a
smaller  and smaller  proportion  of the nation's resources  does  so  in
ways that are less erosive and environmentally  damaging than in the
past. Better practices,  safer chemicals,  alternatives to chemicals  and
greater  sensitivity  to long-term  sustainability  are products  of public
and private investment  and better technology and better education.
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direction.
In short,  we  have  an agricultural  sector  that is  providing  ever
greater abundance  and quality at declining real cost to consumers
for a declining share of national resources and doing so in ways that
are increasingly  sustainable  for the  longer term.  The policy failures,
if that term  is appropriate,  are not those of technological progress
and structural change,  but rather those of failing to adjust  sector as-
sistance policies to present  day realities  (if we were starting from
scratch today,  would the public  stand for putting in place  a set of
programs  like  those  we  inherited  from  the  1930s?)  and failure  of
public  policy to match investments  in technological  improvements
that  provide  a net benefit  to  society  with investments  in  easing the
burden on those  who bear the brunt  of the economic  and social ad-
justments to the technological changes.
With  regard to the latter point,  most of the rural-based  rhetoric
today  about problems  attributed  to "low  farm prices"  is really  a re-
flection of the pain of those  who lose  in the adjustment  process that
accompanies  technological  progress-dying  small  towns,  erosion  of
rural public  services  (health,  education, etc.),  youth leaving rural
areas in search  of jobs elsewhere,  elderly left behind,  nostalgia,  loss
of the familiar,  etc.,  etc.-all part of the economic,  social and psy-
chological cost of change  and progress.  The response  should not be
to stop change and progress, but to have those who benefit from the
progress  (society  in general)  share  some  of that benefit to  ease  the
pain of adjustment,  especially for those least able to afford it.
Why Is Policy  Reform  So Difficult?
For years,  economists  have  been demonstrating  that current and
traditional  agricultural policies lead to distortions in resource prices,
misallocation  of resources,  reduced economic  efficiency,  environ-
mental degradation  and even some regressive  redistribution of in-
come and wealth.  In at least two decades of agricultural policy con-
ferences,  including  this  one,  economists  have  rehashed  these  find-
ings and  then shared  their puzzlement  over the intransigence  of
established policies.  I even detect an air of resignation among econo-
mists,  as  though  accepting  that  the body  politic just  somehow  does
not grasp the obvious "truths"  as we define them.
I  believe  the slowness  of policy  reform is  logical  and explainable.
Recall the earlier statement that as farmers became  a smaller part of
a large industrialized economy,  providing  some assistance  to them in
a time  of crisis (the  1930s) was not only viewed  sympathetically  by
the urban and rural non-farm  population,  but was  also  increasingly
financially  feasible  and  affordable  by non-farm  taxpayers.  In other
words, large  transfer  payments  could  be made  to  a relatively  small
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non-farm  population.
Once  in place, farm  assistance got institutionalized  and,  as farmers
continued  to become a smaller part of the population,  that assistance
became more  difficult to reform.  As a general  rule, in instances  in
which  a few  people  enjoy large benefits  whose costs are  widely dif-
fused across many  other people,  policy reform is difficult.  When pol-
icy reform  poses threats to the large transfer payments  from society
to  farmers,  especially  large  farmers,  those  beneficiaries  have  both
the  incentive  and  the means to  wage  a  defense  of their benefits.
Since reform  generally implies only small per capita gains to the rest
of society, debate about policy reform generally falls on disinter  sted
ears among non-farm interests.  You can guess the usual outcomes  of
those  battles.
It is  somewhat  ironic that farmers  have  long  worried  about their
declining numbers  on the presumption that declining  numbers mean
declining  political  clout. In  fact,  it  is  their relative  fewness  that has
given  them  their  clout.  With  the  number  of producers  receiving
major  benefits being relatively  small,  with agriculture  still physically
highly visible  on the  landscape  and with every senator  having some
agriculture in his/her state, conditions  are right for continued income
and wealth transfers  to farmers.
Several factors  aid and abet the status quo. One is the structure of
congressional committees  which permits most of the debate  about
agricultural policy to be confined to the committees made up of a rel-
atively small number of congressional members whose  political com-
mitment  is  to  established  beneficiaries  of  existing  programs  and
whose  political fortunes  also benefit  substantially  from that commit-
ment.  An  occasional  Don Quixote  to the  contrary,  most rnEmbers  of
Congress not  on the committees see  little political capitai in doing
anything  other than endorsing  the  recommendations  of the agri-
cultural committees.  To improve their clout, agricultural  interests
have aligned themselves into specialty groups to focus their lobbying
efforts  on the even smaller congressional  subcommittees  that deal
with their specialty.
Another  factor  making  it  easier  for  current  beneficiaries  of farm
programs  and their congressional  supporters  to get away  with their
protection  of the status quo is the combination of misperceptions and
ignorance  about agriculture  on the part of most of the population.
This ignorance permits the use of rhetoric about saving the family
farm,  saving rural America  and assuring that we do not run out of
food to defend programs that: transfer most  of the subsidies to farms
quite  different  from those  in the  minds  of sympathetic  city folks;
have little to do with the  well-being of most people  and communities
in rural areas; and have virtually nothing to  do with the  adequacy  of
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is also our responsibility  as public policy educators.
Why  Is Policy  Reform Important?
With  the  costs of farm programs  in the  $8  to $12  billion range  an-
nually,  out of the  $1.5 trillion federal  budget (about .7%),  the cost  of
farm programs is no longer a rallying cry for reform.  One could elim-
inate all  farm programs having direct and indirect transfer payments
and hardly make a dent in the federal deficit,  let alone the budget.
A  more important  reason  to reform  farm programs  is their inher-
ent unfairness.  As I have already discussed,  they simply make no
sense  because they regressively  redistribute  income to those  who
are either wealthy or could cope without that additional income, and
do  little for people  really  in financial  need. In the  process they lead
us to pursue distortive  domestic  policies  and protectionist trade pol-
icies.
But, the  most  important  reason to reform farm  commodity  and
trade  policies is that the continuing  preoccupation  with them diverts
the energy  of our people  and the national leadership  away from  de-
velopment  of policies that  address widespread  rural poverty,  urban
and rural hunger, creation of a new rural economic  vitality,  and a
host  of other problems far  more  important than  whether the
Acreage  Reserve  Program  (ARP) on  rice should  be  5  percent or  10
percent.  These  bigger problems  should  be  shaping  a  whole  new
agenda and sense  of purpose  for the  USDA.  The emphasis  and en-
ergy  and  endless  debate  over  continuing  adjustments  in,  and  man-
agement of, past farm legislation and planning for the upcoming  1995
farm bill while major rural social and economic  problems remain un-
solved, are examples of fiddling  while Rome burns!
Public Policy  Educators and Future Agricultural Policy
This conference-and  our jobs-are about public  policy education.
The job of educators  is  to educate.  Education  is  not simply the shar-
ing of our  own knowledge  and biases,  but rather it is teaching peo-
ple  how to think for themselves.  The  operative  current fad  word  is
"empower."  This means helping people  learn how to  find and proc-
ess information  such that their decisions maximize  the satisfaction  of
their values and goals.
Those  who have been empowered  and motivated  to seek  and
process information may even come to reevaluate  some of what they
had held  as basic  values.  This  is because  some  of those  "values"
may  not be fundamental  values  at all,  but rather old manifestations
of values based on beliefs about the relationships  between the old
manifestations and more fundamental values. But if in the process of
gathering  and  objectively  processing  new  information,  such  people
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likely to question the manifestation they had previously thought of as
a fundamental value.
For example,  suppose you are an agrarian fundamentalist;  you
hold dear the concept  of an agrarian society  or the  agrarian lifestyle
because you feel  people who work the soil and work  with animals
are closer  to nature  and  therefore more  likely to  be keepers  of the
societal  values-honesty,  decency,  God-fearing-that  really  are
important to you. Further, you support,  let us say,  high price sup-
ports  because  you  believe  they  preserve  the  agrarian  lifestyle  and
therefore perpetuate  behavior consistent with your basic values.  But
all of the above becomes questionable  if you accumulate and process
information  convincing  you that high price  supports  do not,  in  fact,
assure the preservation of an agrarian society and, furthermore,  that
farmers are no more honest, decent and God-fearing as a group than
are carpenters,  salesmen or-perish the thought-agricultural  econ-
omists.
Questioning  is a  part of the educational  process,  whether  it leads
to  changing  or  reaffirming  one's  beliefs.  Equipping  people  for pro-
ductive questioning is simply a part of helping people learn about
gathering and processing  information.
The  "information"  learners need to process includes not only "sta-
tistics"  and research results, but exposure  to divergent views and
the rationale behind those  views.  The know-how  to process  that in-
formation  includes  knowing  how  to  critically  evaluate  the  informa-
tion, which may lead to seeking more information.
This may  all sound  a bit abstract,  but it is  what we,  as public pol-
icy educators,  are all  about. Public  policy education  is  hard work.  It
is much harder than traditional  technology  transfer whereby you
relay  to the  customer  the  results of research or  demonstrate  im-
proved  practices.  Even with technology  transfer,  you  have to teach
farmers  and others  how  to evaluate  the new  information  and make
their own decisions.  But it is much easier to convey the test results of
a  new crop  variety  or the comparative  environmental  impacts  of
new and old practices than to conduct educational programs in areas
that tend to impinge on people's values and beliefs.
One  of the big challenges  in public policy education  is to avoid  the
temptation  to  share  one's own  biases  or  views  on  "right"  and
"wrong"  policies.  I suppose  some of that occurs  in non-policy  areas
too;  e.g.,  county agents  who tell farmers  what practices  they
"ought"  to  follow  rather  than teaching  farmers  how  to evaluate
alternative  practices  for themselves.  But, the problem  seems  to  be
more pervasive  and dangerous  in the area  of public policy.  Also,
farm policy tends to  be more controversial  and  we, as  public  policy
educators,  are  sensitive  to controversy.  Thus,  extension  workers
and others involved  in outreach have few qualms about  talking with
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prospect  of conducting  policy education,  especially  when the stu-
dents are already on record with their views-loud and clear.
How do we make progress?  First, I believe we should all be better
students  regarding  agricultural  policy.  It  is essential  that  people  in
the  public  policy  education  business  be  fully  knowledgeable  about
the evolution  of agriculture and agricultural  policy,  about the funda-
mentals of agriculture  and society that drive policy and about how to
analyze the consequences  of alternative policies.
Second,  in order to  be better educators,  we have  to be better stu-
dents of the  learning process.  That is,  we  really have  to work  at
being better at helping people learn how to think for themselves  and
how to find the fodder  for  that thinking.  The extension "learning
workshop"  that  preceded  the  Orlando  American  Agricultural  Eco-
nomics  Association  (AAEA)  meetings  in August  of  this year  was
helpful,  as are the workshops conducted annually at this conference.
Perhaps we need  to adapt and improve  on those workshops and in-
corporate them more  widely in in-service training in the states.
Another  thought.  Perhaps scholars  and practitioners  should be
convened  to  draw  up  some national  standards for  evaluating  the
content  and  effectiveness  of public  policy  education  programs.
Those  standards could be used as guidelines for state and  federal
program reviewers.
I believe  the future direction of public  policy for agriculture  de-
pends very heavily  on how producers  and their representatives  view
their  vested interests  as  being affected  by  alternative  policies,  and
on how well the rest of the  population and its leadership understand
the state of agriculture  and the consequences  of agricultural policy.  I
truly believe  in  the effectiveness  of transparency  in  policy.  Despite
all  the farm policy conferences  that have been held,  and the public
policy  education  programs  underway,  U.S.  farm  policy  and  its  do-
mestic  and global  effects  are not transparent  to  the vast  majority  of
the American people. Correcting that condition is our challenge.
It is important that public  policymakers themselves  understand
the  consequences  of  alternative  policies  and  the  effectiveness  of
alternative  approaches  to achieving  policy  goals.  I  am convinced
some  of them  already understand  much  of what I  have  discussed  in
this paper.  But leaders  cannot  go farther than followers  will  follow.
Thus,  if we  want better policy  from the  Congress  and the  admin-
istration  we have  to have an  educated  public demanding better  pol-
icy  from  their leaders.  Policymakers  do represent  the  sentiments  of
the majority of their constituents,  and agricultural  policy at any point
in  time probably  reflects  the  state  of perception  and policy  literacy
on the part of producers and the general public.
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I  was asked to share  some  of my biases and observations.  I  have
done  as I  was requested  in the  hope  of stimulating useful dialogue.
In keeping with my role of sharing biases, let me end with  a forecast
of the direction of agricultural policy over the next two decades.
Commodity support programs  will not end abruptly  in the near fu-
ture but  will  slowly fade into  the background  and become  less  and
less the center of attention. The budget will continue to constrain ex-
penditures,  but that could mean expenditures continuing in the $6  to
$12  billion  range  for several  more  years.  Budget pressures  could
force some creative thinking about the tools of farm assistance.  If the
House and  Senate conferees agree  to eliminate the  wool and honey
support programs this year,  that will set a precedent.  But the prece-
dent will more likely be applicable  to minor commodities than to the
big three:  cotton,  grains and oilseeds  and dairy.  The  clout for those
major, widely-produced  commodities  is  still substantial.
Commodity  support programs  will also  slowly  become  less  attrac-
tive  to  producers.  As pointed out earlier,  because  of fixed  program
yields,  0-92 type programs and reductions  in the acres eligible for
payment under the flexible acreage  program, the proportion of grain
production covered  by target prices and deficiency payments  is now
likely  below  three-fourths  and  declining.  In time  this  could  reduce
program participation  and hence effectiveness  of supply manage-
ment.
Also,  traditional  commodity  policy  will  fade  into  the  background
because of the pressures  of other issues and constituencies.  Already
more than half of the USDA's budget goes for food stamps and food
assistance  programs.  More than  one third  of USDA's  employees
work for the Forest Service.  The farm assis tance programs account
for less than one-fourth of USDA's budget.  Still,  the secretary  of ag-
riculture  tends to be consumed  by traditional  farm commodity policy
issues.  This  is true because  we are  always  in the  process  of imple-
menting  a  recent  farm bill,  managing  existing legislation  or  prepar-
ing for  a new  farm bill.  This  is  also true because  we have  an  ac-
cumulation of sixty years of farm programs that require  a continuous
flow  of day-to-day operational  decisions  by the secretary.  However,
as new  issues are around  longer, and laws  and regulations  begin  to
accumulate  for those  new  issues,  more  of the secretary's  attention
will be drawn to necessary  decisions in the management  of those
programs,  and she/he will be less preoccupied  with traditional  com-
modity  programs.  That is  already beginning  to happen for environ-
mental  programs and,  to  a lesser extent,  for  food safety.  As the  at-
tention of the secretary  is forced to  shift,  and as  new infrastructure
and political alignments develop around the new issues, the char-
acter of the USDA will change  also; more than it already has.
53Finally,  within the  next five  to ten years, the generation  of people
who  have staffed  the  USDA and  the congressional  committees  dur-
ing the  post  World  War II  period,  mostly  white  males  with farm
backgrounds,  will have retired.  In fact,  within the next two years
USDA is projecting that about half of its senior executives  will retire.
These  are  the  experienced  people  who  have grown  up with  and
managed the traditional  agricultural policies for the  past three  or
four decades.  This retiring generation will be replaced  in the USDA,
congressional  committees and Washington  lobby groups by a gener-
ation that comes largely from an urban background and, particularly
in USDA,  is more  reflective  of the  larger  population  mix.  This new
generation  will be talented  and competent.  But their understanding
of,  and their emotional  commitment  to,  agriculture  will be different
from those  of their predecessors.  Moreover,  because  of their back-
grounds,  they  will bring to their jobs  less  of a farm perspective  and
more  of a broad orientation toward  a whole new array  of social, en-
vironmental  and  economic  issues.  In that  environment  and  with all
the other changes  gradually  taking place,  agricultural policy  will be
a whole new ball game.
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